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C URRENT interest in economic matters often focuses upon developments and prospects short run in nature. 
Employment prospects during the next few years, the likely 
course of prices over a short period of time-these and similar 
issues merit and receive detailed attention, Concern with 
economic events that are to occur in the near future is natu- 
ral enough. Quite often the events of the immediate future 
seem to have the most practical significance to us all. Never- 
theless, there has been, of late, increased interest on the part 
of professional economists in longer-run issues. 
In  particular, the prospects for economic growth over long 
periods of time are being subjected to detailed analysis. This 
interest: in longer-run issues reflects a renewal of interest 
rather than a new line of inquiry. Economists of other gen- 
erations centered their investigations on basic economic 
forces the effects of which might be felt only over very long 
periods of time. For example, David Ricardo and his con- 
temporaries regarded the operation of market forces with 
only passing interest and centered most of their efforts on an 
analysis of long-run equilibrium. Karl Marx, who borrowed 
so heavily from Ricardian value theory, tried to establish 
immutable socio-economic laws which would explain the 
course of economic events over centuries. 
In fact it is rather more difficult to explain why the interest 
of economists in long-run matters ever slackened than to 
account for athe present interest in the factors influencing 
economic growth. 
Whatever the underlying reasons for the emphasis on 
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short-run analysis, there seems to be little doubt that the 
great depression of the 1930's played a major role in shifting 
the attention of economists to short-run problems. In the face 
of a cyclical movement of unparalleled severity, longer-run 
problems seemed to shrink in significance. Many economists 
came to accept Keynes' half-facetious observation that "in 
the long run we are all dead." However, the pendulum which 
swung so far in the direction of short-run analysis in the 
1930's seems to be swinging back once more. While con- 
temporary economists are not prone to ignore short-rrun 
issues, a considerable measure of the work currently being 
done centers upon the requirements for and conditions of 
economic growth over long periods of time. 
Economic growth refers to the secular trend of crucial 
economic time series. Growth may, of course, be negative al- 
though experience in this country has not shown other than 
an upward progression in our ability to produce goods and 
services. This record of past performance is perhaps largely 
accountable for the appearance of optimistic predictions 
that, in this country at least, we may look forward to an 
"economy of abundance." These forecasts of "abundance" 
are rarely the handiwork of academic economists, who are 
rather cautious in their pronouncements as to the future. But 
outside of academic circles, there is frequent reference to 
"abundance" as the end-product of economic growth, 
What are the prospects for an economy of abundance? 
First, one can scarcely neglect the fact that-for the world 
economy-scarcity rather than abundance is still the predom- 
inant characteristic. While our own students are exposed to 
economic writings which treat Thomas Malthus as a pessi- 
mistic English parson whose predictive powers were negli- 
gible, I wonder whether students of economics in vast areas 
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of the world can accept this judgment in good conscience. 
For outside of the Western World there are only isolated 
areas where the pressure of population on resources is not 
acute. In those areas less fortunately endowed with material 
advantages, abundance refers only to the numbers of mouths 
to be fed and the phrase "economy of abundance" appears 
in the propaganda arsenal as an exhortation for revolutionary 
action rather than as an objective description of future pros- 
pects. 
It seems clear that the prospects for abundance are rather 
limited geographically. But what of the prospects for the 
American economy-demonstrably the world's highest in- 
come region? Here too, one must be cautious. Past growth 
in material performance seems to have brought with it ac- 
celerated growth in the community's denland for goods and 
services. Before we enter into the land of milk and honey it 
may be necessary for there to be a slackening in what we 
demand. The probability of this occurrence is not large. Suc- 
cessive generations are not only born into a society with en- 
larged economic capacity but enter that society with (or soon 
develop) greatly enlarged appetites. Paradoxically enough, 
later generations may live and die in an economy of abun- 
dance without ever knowing it. This is as it should be from a 
narrow economic standpoint-growth in the ability to pro- 
duce seems to require that the demands of the community be 
rising somewhat faster than the capacity to produce. 
For these reasons and others, the phase "economy of 
abundance" turns out to be a non-operational concept. I 
would substitute "economic growth" for "economy of abun- 
dance." The prospect for economic growth is far less contro- 
versial. Even so, the host of interrelated factors which are 
basic to economic growth defy neat separation. 
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I shall limit my observations this afternoon to the part that 
wages and productivity may play in economic growth. In 
addition to disclaiming any effort to examine in detail factors 
other than wages and productivity which may iduence 
economic growth, I should like to ignore the connection (if 
any) between economic growth and what we might term 
social progress. Whether or not we collectively become better 
men and women as we achieve higher levels of material 
performance is at best conjectural and an issue upon which 
I do not wish to hazard a guess. The reason for this reluc- 
tance is simple enough. Economists may be capable of deal- 
ing with economic performance but have no special qualifi- 
cations to pass judgment on matters which are non-economic. 
This reluctance should extend to the future as well as the 
past. Therefore, I am as unwilling to correlate future Ameri- 
can economic growth with social progress in the broadest 
sense as I would be to deprecate Hellenic civilization be- 
cause the Greeks were not overly adept at fiscal policy. 
Even this wholesale exclusion leaves us with an abundance 
of controversial issues. I should like to separate the discus- 
sion of the role of wages and productivity in economic 
growth into the following divisions. First, it is necessay to 
examine some aspects of the historical behavior of wages 
and productivity. Second, it will be desirable to appraise the 
theoretical explanations which economists present for wage- 
productivity behavior. Third, I will comment upon some 
recent developments in the use of wage-productivity data in 
the collective bargaining process. 
HISTORICAL W A G E - P R O D U C ~  BEHAVIOR 
Suppose that we had an accurate index of productivity 
(the volume of output produced by one hour's labor). If the 
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ratio of output to man-hour inputs shows an increase, the 
economy is more productive in the sense that a larger volume 
of output (however distributed) is attainable with a given 
labor input, This we may term the productivity effect. There 
is a temptation to treat long-period increases in productivity 
as presumptive evidence that the economy is better off, i.e., 
that there has been an increase in economic welfare. While 
I, personally, am prone to regard increases in productivity 
as desirable, it is not legitimate to regard increases in the 
productivity ratio as conclusive evidence of increasing eco- 
nomic welfare. Two major points should be stressed. 
First, the productivity ratio is a measure of efficiency not 
totally unlike engineering efficiency ratios. Like other ma- 
chines the economic system may operate at various speeds. 
But when the economic system runs at slow speed (during 
periods of deep depression) its efficiency (as judged by the 
productivity ratio) may be higher than when the economic 
system operates near its rated capacity. We can easily see 
why productivity ratios might increase during periods of 
depression, Periods of depression can lead to the discharge 
of the least efficient employees and the shut-down of the 
least efficient plants and equipment first. Therefore, econ- 
omy-wide productivity may be raised as the economy pro- 
duces less and less. Common sense dictates that the produc- 
tivity ratio must be supplemented by a measure of the level 
of economic activity. Actually this is not serious for this dif- 
ficulty is a matter of interpretation. I only raise it to indicate 
the danger of an unthinking dependence upon a single 
measure of economic performance. 
The second point I wish to stress so that historical produc- 
tivity comparisons will not be overrated is, perhaps, a slightly 
more subtle one. Let us assume an economic community that 
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historically has always operated at full employment and, 
furthermore, has become steadily more productive through 
time. Has that community3s economic welfare increased? 
Perhaps many would conclude that economic welfare had 
increased, but some economists would defer judgment. 
Surely this is a gross example of economists' notorious in- 
ability to arrive at definite conclusions. Or is it? Let us re- 
flect a moment. 
If real wages demonstrated a historical tendency to in- 
crease at a much faster rate than productivity, we would 
infer that the share of real output distributed as wage-pay- 
ments was increasing secularly and that the share of output 
distributed to capital (and other factors of production) was 
decreasing. Correspondingly, if real wages did not increase 
apace with productivity gains, we would infer that a redis- 
tribution of real product away from wage-earners was taking 
place. For the sake of brevity let us refer to these possible 
changes as redistributive effects. 
If we accept productivity increases as the sole measure of 
economic welfare, we have ignored the redistributive effects. 
There is a dilemma at this point. Take two coUections of 
goods and services-one produced in 1958 and another larger 
collection produced in 1960. I t  is almost certain that the larger 
1960 output will be differently distributed. It follows that 
although average incomes are higher, every individual income 
will not be. A rise in an average is thoroughly consistent with 
a fall in many of its components. When we speak of economic 
welfare we speak of two interrelated issues: one, is objective 
-the physical volume of production; the other, is subjective- 
the distribution, of the -physical volume of production. Econ- 
omists are reluctant to make value judgments and hence many 
economists would hesitate to select a single distribution pat- 
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tern of product (or income) as the right one, For notice, that 
when a certain distribution is adjudged desirable something 
is implied as to the comparability of the satisfactions different 
individuals experience. Certain areas of economic theory deal 
rather exhaustively with this problem. I would only observe 
here that the safest course is to accept productivity increases 
as evidence of potential increases in economic welfare; and 
that men of good will may differ as to whether the potential 
is realized-as a consequence of their different non-economic 
criteria as to how productivity gains should be shared. 
I should now like to take a brief look at the historical wage- 
productivity experience of the American economy. I will 
not belabor the obvious or smother you in statistics, but in 
this country economic growth has been so phenomena1 as to 
deserve some reference to its magnitude. 
The most comprehensive measure of economy-wide per- 
formance for which reasonably accurate historical data are 
available is the series for gross national product. Gross na- 
tional product is a measure of total annual output of goods 
and services. Where one's interest lies in long-period changes 
in physical quantities it is essential to eliminate the effects 
of changes in the price level. When the gross national prod- 
uct series has been converted to constant dollars by an ap- 
propriate price index, it serves as an indicator of changes in 
physical output. In  terms of decade averages, gross national 
product stood at $29.4 billion per year for the period 1891- 
1900, and $149.3 for 1941-1950 (both in terms of 1939 prices). 
Consequently, the volume of production increased approxi- 
mately five times over the five decades from 1891. This five- 
fold increase amounted to an annual compound rate of 
growth in excess of 3 per cent. 
During the same five decades, population almost exactly 
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doubled. I t  follows that the volume of production per capita 
increased two and one-haIf times in fifty years. One factor 
operates to understate even this phenomenal advance. These 
comparisons can take no direct account of changes in the 
quality of commodities and services going to make up the 
national product. For example, a 1915 and a 1955 automobile 
would be weighted according to their constant dollar price. 
When we reflect upon the changes in quality which have 
occurred, the record of growth is even more striking. 
When wage and productivity series are corrected for price 
change by working in terms of 1939 dollars, we find that 
real wages, which stood at $.31 per hour in 1914, had risen 
to $.86 per hour by 1950. On the other hand, real product 
per man hour amounted to $.56 in 1914 and had increased to 
$1.18 by 1950. When the yearly observations for real wages 
and productivity are compared, we find close similarity in 
their movements over the 1914-1950 period. I do not suggest 
that every yearly variation in one series is matched by a 
corresponding variation in the other series. The short-run 
correspondence in the series is not impressive. But over the 
entire period, real wages and productivity moved upwards 
together. 
Aside from the sheer magnitude of our economic growth, 
the parallel rise in real wages and productivity is of interest. 
We would say in statistical terms that the two series display 
a high degree of correlation and, indeed, when we conlpute a 
coefficient of correlation we find it to be large. When two 
series such as wages and productivity do move together over 
long periods of time, we are tempted to examine the circum- 
stances closely in the hope that theory can afford us a con- 
vincing explanation-or a tentative law of behavior. But it is 
well known that high coefficients of correlation can mislead 
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the investigator. Economics and the other social sciences 
can present innumerable examples where two time series 
have displayed an extremely high degree of correspondence 
without there being the slightest logical connection between 
the two series. So as we turn to the economists' theoretical 
explanations of wage-productivity behavior we must carsy 
with us some doubt as to the support that correlation analysis 
can give the theorist. 
The traditional theoretical explanation of wage-produc- 
tivity behavior was developed by economists of the late 19th 
century. The theory of marginal productivity, as it was 
called, received its fullest exposition in this country at the 
hands of John Bates Clark. Basically the theory involved the 
application of the differential calculus to the economic prob- 
lem. Of course the calculus had been developed a few cen- 
turies previously but economists are slow to learn new tricks. 
They did learn this trick rather well and the theory of mar- 
ginal productivity was gradually developed into an imposing 
theoretical edifice. 
One feature of the marginal productivity theoiy to which 
I wish to direct attention was its assertion that the annual 
physical output of an economy was distributed in a definite, 
predictable fashion among the cooperating factors of pro- 
duction: land, labor, and capital. Where the assumptions of 
the theory are satisfied we should expect that real wages, for 
example, would be measured by the increment to total prod- 
uct accounted for by marginal units of labor. I am less in- 
terested now in the application of the calculus than in a 
feature of the marginal productivity theory which I believe 
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was implicit rather than explicit in the analysis. I t  was 
later assumed by many people that a caz~sal relationship ex- 
isted between productivity and wages and ran f rom produc- 
tivity to wages. This may correspond fairly well with com- 
mon sense although there is, I suppose, some doubt as to 
whether increased productivity is a necessary condition for 
higher wages in some cases-coal mining and the building 
trades come to mind. 
However, we do not test theories against intuition or iso- 
lated aspects of experience-or should not. What about the 
high degree of correlation between wages and productivity 
that was mentioned earlier? Is not this the empirical support 
for the proposition that causation runs from productivity to 
wages? No, I am afraid that it is not. Statistical procedures 
are innocent of causation although statisticians are some- 
times not. The parallel growth in wages and productivity is 
consistent with productivity-wage C ~ U S ~ ~ ~ O D  but it does not 
"prove" it by any stretch of the imagination. 
Although economists may have typically inclined toward 
a view that productivity increases pull wages up with them, 
this interpretation is not the only one possible. In fact, if one 
were a true sceptic he might wish to place himself on the 
other side of the fence from many practicing economists. One 
of my colleagues has, in fact, given signs of being such a 
sceptic by pressing an investigation into the possibility that 
the marginal productivity theorists had it the wrong way 
around and that actually lines of causation (under certain 
circumstances) may run from wages to productivity. This is 
an interesting hypothesis which we might tei-nl "reverse 
causation." 
Offhand, one might object that reverse causation is un- 
likely on the ground that increased wages cannot come out 
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of increased production which has not yet occurred. But I do 
not know that such a judgment would be decisive. It is 
within the realm of possibility that higher wage payments 
could lead to increased research and development activity 
resulting, perhaps, in an enhanced ability to produce. In such 
a case, wages would lead productivity and exert some causa- 
tive influence. There are rather obvious limits to such a proc- 
ess. Wages could be (and perhaps sometimes are) raised so 
high as to squeeze profits not a little but unmercifully. Still, 
the older accent on a rigid line of causation ivnning from 
productivity to wages was unfortunate and like all simple 
cause-and-effect relationships is to be regarded with sus- 
picion. Lest my remarks here be interpreted as a plea for 
higher and higher wages regardless of productivity develop- 
ments, let me add that I would also regard a simple line of 
causation from wages to productivity with a considerable de- 
gree of suspicion. 
I have alluded to two possible explanations for long-run 
wage-productivity behavior. One, derived from the marginal 
productivity analysis, calls for productivity leading wages. 
The other, reverse causation, calls for wages leading produc- 
tivity. The statistical evidence does not help us here. There is 
no consistent lead or lag between wages and productivity. 
Instead, the short-run behavior of the two series seems to be 
irregular, with first one then the other series showing the 
way. I t  is my own feeling-based, perhaps, as much on intui- 
tion as on firm evidence-that no unvarying causal relation- 
ship exists between wages and productivity. I would propose 
the following explanation for wage-productivity behavior, In 
certain instances either wage changes or productivity 
changes may lead, but actually wages and productivity are 
mutually determining and perhaps mutually determined, By 
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"mutually determining" I mean to suggest that productivity 
and wages are linked through time with each one influencing 
the other and, in turn, influenced by it. By "mutually de- 
teimined," I only wish to emphasize the obvious-that wages 
and productivity are but two economic variables in a com- 
plex of many economic (and non-economic) variables. I t  fol- 
lows that we must be alert to the possibility that the parallel 
growth of wages and productivity is, in fact, to be traced to 
some common iduencing factor or factors. 
This explanation of wage-productivity behavior is, I feel, 
closer to the facts of experience but perhaps less satisfying 
in that it leaves us with no simple, invariant explanation in 
terms of cause and effect. One role of economic theory is to 
narrow the possible range of alternatives which may occur. 
But there can be no justification for inflicting a theory on 
economic events which narrows the range of alternatives un- 
duly. I simply do not believe that a simple, causal explana- 
tion of fluctuations in wages and productivity will do, and 
if this is true we are forced to the judgment that past theories 
of wage-productivity behavior have, in some respects, been 
defective, 
I should like now to turn to a discussion of some recent 
developments in the collective bargaining process with ref- 
erence to the positions of the interested parties (labor and 
management) on the relationship of wages and productivity. 
The discussion will necessarily be selective and, in the in- 
terests of brevity, I will limit myself to two of the many as- 
pects of this problem. First, I should like to comment upon 
the occasional recourse to productivity as a foimula for wage- 
fixing. Second, I shall point to what seems to me to be a 
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rather fundamental change in the attitude of organized labor 
toward the wage-productivity question. 
The use of productivity as a formula for wage-setting has 
never been widespread (except for piece-rate plans); but 
some increased interest in the possibility of productivity 
formulas has been evidenced since World War 11. Superfici- 
ally, it might seem that productivity data could be very use- 
ful in this regard. After all, productivity (if measured cor- 
rectly) should be an objective guide. Where the ability to 
turn out physical product in an hour, or a day, or a week has 
increased, should not the wage increase? Perhaps so, but 
available productivity data are almost invariably defective 
for the purpose to which they are so often put, namely, 
measming the increased contribution of labor per se, 
Productivity comparisons can be made in the following 
fashion. An index of physical output is divided by an index 
of labor-time input. Therefore is physical pro- 
ductivity per unit of labor time. A simple example may serve 
to demonstrate that this measure of productivity has serious 
shortcomings, Suppose that for a certain firm we compare 
this year's output with last. Suppose further that physical 
output has doubIed while labor works the same number of 
hours. Then productivity has doubled. But notice-and this is 
ciucial-we do not know (without detailed examination) 
what caused the productivity gain. It is possible, of course, 
that labor, working with the same tools and equipment, 
really has worked just twice as hard-realIy has expended 
twice as much physical effort. But suppose that instead of 
increased labor effort, the company had borrowed money 
and installed new machinely and equipment. Could we as- 
sert then that labor, as a factor of production, was entitled to 
all of the productivity gain? I should think not. 
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The point which I wish to emphasize is that productivity 
gains typically result from cooperative effort on the part of 
many factors of production. There is, then, a joint claim to 
productivity gains. True, productivity is measured in terms 
of labor-time inputs but this is a statistical convenience and 
should never imply that the only source of productivity is 
labor. In practice the contribution of labor and management 
(for example) is so inextricably merged that detailed calcula- 
tion of the separate contributions of each is well-nigh im- 
possible. It follows that any formula approach to wage de- 
termination using productivity data must be a compromise, 
No matter how intricate the calculations, we may rest as- 
sured that the decision to tie wages to productivity is the 
result of a bargain rather than the result of any immutable 
laws of production. Of course a bargain is a bargain and if 
the interested parties wish to seal their bargain with a for- 
mula that is their concern, 
Perhaps the best known of the folmula approaches to wage 
determination is that embodied in the agreement between 
General Motors and the United Automobile Workers. There 
the agreement is complicated by the fact that wages are also 
tied to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Index of Consumer 
Prices, with contractual provisions for wage adjustments 
either up or down. But an integral part of the General Motors 
agreement is the provision for periodic wage increases to ad- 
just for enhanced productivity. Unless one is a firm believer 
in a one-way chain of causation running from productivity 
to wages, it should be observed that the productivity incre- 
ment to wages can be viewed either as a reward for past 
effort or as a pre-paid reward for future effort. Where the 
contract runs for a period of years, it is idle to speculate as 
to which is cause and which is effect. 
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The General Motors formula has not established a pattern 
for American industry, although it surely has established a 
precedent, There are rather good reasons why the use of a 
productivity formula in wage determination is not likely to 
become widespread. First of all, the measurement of produc- 
tivity is virtually impossible for the service industries which 
comprise so much of modern economic activity. Second, re- 
lating wages to productivity is only feasible where the in- 
dividual firm or industry position is well established and 
short-run variations in profits can be tolerated. Third, for 
productivity to serve as a wage-criterion, both management 
and labor must feel that such wage-bargaining is in their 
own interests. These situations are not common. 
I do not mean to suggest that no recourse will be made to 
productivity comparisons in future negotiations. Surely it 
will. But I should like to counter the notion that productivity 
data furnish reliable criteria for wage determination in broad 
areas of the economy. Throughout much of the past decade- 
and particularly in the immediate post-World War I1 years- 
many commentators suggested (properly) that excessive 
wage demands in an inflationary setting can, under certain 
conditions, lead to a wage-price spiral. But some commen- 
tators went further and contended (improperly) that an op- 
erational guide to national wage policy is available from 
statistics of productivity. The suggestion was that yearly in- 
crements to real wages should be limited to yearly incre- 
ments in nation-wide productivity. The suggestion is well- 
meaning enough but thoroughly impractical as an objective 
guide in given situations. National productivity gains are 
gross averages. In some industries productivity may decline 
-in other industries productivity may increase. The disper- 
sion around the national average is very substantial. Average 
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national productivity is of interest to the economic historian 
but its relevance for those who bargain over wages in sub- 
sectors of the economy is practically non-existent. 
I t  seems beyond dispute that for some time to come, col- 
lective bargaining over wages will continue without the aid 
of any magic formula relating productivity and wages. This 
is for the best. For despite the contentions of some theoreti- 
cal economists, wage determination is not a price-making 
process such as may be observed in well-organized commod- 
ity markets. Bargaining over wages is but one aspect of an 
area of interest (and conflict) between institutional groups. 
The resolution of problems which asise in these settings is 
rarely aided by reference to foimulas or capable of being 
stated in quantitative terms. 
I should like to refer now to what seems to  me to be a 
rather basic change in the attitude of organized labor toward 
the wage-productivity issue. In  the past, labor has laid claim 
to some portion of productivity gains either on the basis of 
self-evident interest or upon grounds of distributive equity 
or justice. A somewhat different argument has been ad- 
vanced by labor spokesmen within the past decade or so. 
Drawing upon the experience of the 19307s, organized 
labor has pressed a new asgument for wage increases in the 
face of productivity gains. The essence of the new labor ar- 
gument is that where wage increases do not keep pace with 
productivity gains, an insufficiency of consumer purchasing 
power may bring about periods of depression and unem- 
ploy m ent . 
In  order to evaluate this argument it is necessary to in- 
quire into the relationship between wages, purchasing 
power, and employ~nent, Prior to the 1930's it was generally 
accepted that wage reductions would nornlally increase em- 
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ployment in a depression setting. The reasoning was simple 
enough-perhaps too simple. Wages were regarded as a cost 
of production to individual employers. A general wage re- 
duction through its cost-lowering impact would encourage 
employers to hire more labor, thereby reducing unemploy- 
ment. Now this line of reasoning does seem proper in the 
case of an ijzdiuidual business f i~m; but notice that the an- 
swer to the question as to the effect of an economy-wide 
wage reduction is to be sought in the actions of all firms. 
Where wages are reduced by all firms, economy-wide pur- 
chasing power falls as wages are reduced and we can by no 
means be sure that employers will find their products mar- 
ketable at a profit. 
In other words, an economy-wide reduction will have two 
effects. One-the cost effect-works in the direction of in- 
creasing employment. The other-the purchasing power eff ect 
-works in the direction of reducing employment. Since a 
pj8iot.i we know only the directions of change (which are op- 
posite) we cannot conclude with certainty what will be the 
net effect of wage reduction on employment and production. 
While it may be said that recent labor positions empha- 
size the purchasing power aspect of wage increases, the labor 
argument contains one ingredient which we have not men- 
tioned explicitly. Judging from labor proposals at the time 
of the 1949 recession, we may state their position in the fol- 
lowing terms. When a slackening in economic activity ap- 
pears imminent, wage increases involve a transfer of pur- 
chasing power from profit-recipients. This transfer, labor 
spokesmen allege, will sustain the flow of total spending 
since at the onset of a recession, with business expectations 
shaken, retained corporate earnings are not so likely to be 
returned to the income stream through expansions in plant 
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and equipment. This argument would seem to regard wage 
increases as a form of medicine for employers-nasty to taste 
but capable of restoring health. 
If one were to select a single criticism of the labor argu- 
ment it would be that the position unduly neglects the cost 
and allocative aspects of the wage and concentrates upon the 
purchasing power aspect. My own feeling would be that the 
maintenance of satisfactory levels of national output and 
employment requires rather complicated monetary and fiscal 
measures. More is involved in the problem than pumping 
purchasing power into the economy through the debatable 
medium of wage increases. 
The following summary conclusions may be drawn: 
1. Despite a close statistical relationship between long- 
run movements in real wages and productivity, there is no 
all-conclusive case that either productivity or wages exerts 
a causal influence. 
2. Productivity gains vary widely in sub-sectors of the 
economy, and a national average of productivity is a gross 
average concealing widely divergent movements in its com- 
ponents. 
3. Productivity statistics are primarily useful as measures 
of over-a11 economic growth or performance. However, the 
wage-productivity relationship is sufficiently complex that 
there is little serious prospect of the widespread application of 
a productivity formula as a wage criterion. 
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